Paper
Agency and Architectural Limits: Why Optimization-Based Systems Cannot Be Norm-Responsive
Authors
Radha Sarma
Abstract
AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes contexts -- medical diagnosis, legal research, financial analysis -- under the assumption they can be governed by norms. This paper demonstrates that assumption is formally invalid for optimization-based systems, specifically Large Language Models trained via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). We establish that genuine agency requires two necessary and jointly sufficient architectural conditions: the capacity to maintain certain boundaries as non-negotiable constraints rather than tradeable weights (Incommensurability), and a non-inferential mechanism capable of suspending processing when those boundaries are threatened (Apophatic Responsiveness). These conditions apply across all normative domains. RLHF-based systems are constitutively incompatible with both conditions. The operations that make optimization powerful -- unifying all values on a scalar metric and always selecting the highest-scoring output -- are precisely the operations that preclude normative governance. This incompatibility is not a correctable training bug awaiting a technical fix; it is a formal constraint inherent to what optimization is. Consequently, documented failure modes - sycophancy, hallucination, and unfaithful reasoning - are not accidents but structural manifestations. Misaligned deployment triggers a second-order risk we term the Convergence Crisis: when humans are forced to verify AI outputs under metric pressure, they degrade from genuine agents into criteria-checking optimizers, eliminating the only component in the system capable of normative accountability. Beyond the incompatibility proof, the paper's primary positive contribution is a substrate-neutral architectural specification defining what any system -- biological, artificial, or institutional -- must satisfy to qualify as an agent rather than a sophisticated instrument.
Metadata
Related papers
Vibe Coding XR: Accelerating AI + XR Prototyping with XR Blocks and Gemini
Ruofei Du, Benjamin Hersh, David Li, Nels Numan, Xun Qian, Yanhe Chen, Zhongy... • 2026-03-25
Comparing Developer and LLM Biases in Code Evaluation
Aditya Mittal, Ryan Shar, Zichu Wu, Shyam Agarwal, Tongshuang Wu, Chris Donah... • 2026-03-25
The Stochastic Gap: A Markovian Framework for Pre-Deployment Reliability and Oversight-Cost Auditing in Agentic Artificial Intelligence
Biplab Pal, Santanu Bhattacharya • 2026-03-25
Retrieval Improvements Do Not Guarantee Better Answers: A Study of RAG for AI Policy QA
Saahil Mathur, Ryan David Rittner, Vedant Ajit Thakur, Daniel Stuart Schiff, ... • 2026-03-25
MARCH: Multi-Agent Reinforced Self-Check for LLM Hallucination
Zhuo Li, Yupeng Zhang, Pengyu Cheng, Jiajun Song, Mengyu Zhou, Hao Li, Shujie... • 2026-03-25
Raw Data (Debug)
{
"raw_xml": "<entry>\n <id>http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23239v1</id>\n <title>Agency and Architectural Limits: Why Optimization-Based Systems Cannot Be Norm-Responsive</title>\n <updated>2026-02-26T17:16:17Z</updated>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23239v1' rel='alternate' type='text/html'/>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.23239v1' rel='related' title='pdf' type='application/pdf'/>\n <summary>AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes contexts -- medical diagnosis, legal research, financial analysis -- under the assumption they can be governed by norms. This paper demonstrates that assumption is formally invalid for optimization-based systems, specifically Large Language Models trained via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). We establish that genuine agency requires two necessary and jointly sufficient architectural conditions: the capacity to maintain certain boundaries as non-negotiable constraints rather than tradeable weights (Incommensurability), and a non-inferential mechanism capable of suspending processing when those boundaries are threatened (Apophatic Responsiveness). These conditions apply across all normative domains.\n RLHF-based systems are constitutively incompatible with both conditions. The operations that make optimization powerful -- unifying all values on a scalar metric and always selecting the highest-scoring output -- are precisely the operations that preclude normative governance. This incompatibility is not a correctable training bug awaiting a technical fix; it is a formal constraint inherent to what optimization is. Consequently, documented failure modes - sycophancy, hallucination, and unfaithful reasoning - are not accidents but structural manifestations.\n Misaligned deployment triggers a second-order risk we term the Convergence Crisis: when humans are forced to verify AI outputs under metric pressure, they degrade from genuine agents into criteria-checking optimizers, eliminating the only component in the system capable of normative accountability. Beyond the incompatibility proof, the paper's primary positive contribution is a substrate-neutral architectural specification defining what any system -- biological, artificial, or institutional -- must satisfy to qualify as an agent rather than a sophisticated instrument.</summary>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.AI'/>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.CY'/>\n <published>2026-02-26T17:16:17Z</published>\n <arxiv:comment>About 10,500 words in all (including 922 words of literature and 2019 words of Appendices). Under journal review</arxiv:comment>\n <arxiv:primary_category term='cs.AI'/>\n <author>\n <name>Radha Sarma</name>\n </author>\n </entry>"
}