Paper
Evaluating Counterfactual Strategic Reasoning in Large Language Models
Authors
Dimitrios Georgousis, Maria Lymperaiou, Angeliki Dimitriou, Giorgos Filandrianos, Giorgos Stamou
Abstract
We evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in repeated game-theoretic settings to assess whether strategic performance reflects genuine reasoning or reliance on memorized patterns. We consider two canonical games, Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), upon which we introduce counterfactual variants that alter payoff structures and action labels, breaking familiar symmetries and dominance relations. Our multi-metric evaluation framework compares default and counterfactual instantiations, showcasing LLM limitations in incentive sensitivity, structural generalization and strategic reasoning within counterfactual environments.
Metadata
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Raw Data (Debug)
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"raw_xml": "<entry>\n <id>http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.19167v1</id>\n <title>Evaluating Counterfactual Strategic Reasoning in Large Language Models</title>\n <updated>2026-03-19T17:23:20Z</updated>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.19167v1' rel='alternate' type='text/html'/>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.19167v1' rel='related' title='pdf' type='application/pdf'/>\n <summary>We evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in repeated game-theoretic settings to assess whether strategic performance reflects genuine reasoning or reliance on memorized patterns. We consider two canonical games, Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), upon which we introduce counterfactual variants that alter payoff structures and action labels, breaking familiar symmetries and dominance relations. Our multi-metric evaluation framework compares default and counterfactual instantiations, showcasing LLM limitations in incentive sensitivity, structural generalization and strategic reasoning within counterfactual environments.</summary>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.CL'/>\n <published>2026-03-19T17:23:20Z</published>\n <arxiv:primary_category term='cs.CL'/>\n <author>\n <name>Dimitrios Georgousis</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Maria Lymperaiou</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Angeliki Dimitriou</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Giorgos Filandrianos</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Giorgos Stamou</name>\n </author>\n </entry>"
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