Research

Paper

AI LLM March 13, 2026

AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agents

Authors

Aojie Yuan, Zhiyuan Su, Yue Zhao

Abstract

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Metadata

arXiv ID: 2603.12621
Provider: ARXIV
Primary Category: cs.CR
Published: 2026-03-13
Fetched: 2026-03-16 06:01

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Raw Data (Debug)
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