Paper
All Vehicles Can Lie: Efficient Adversarial Defense in Fully Untrusted-Vehicle Collaborative Perception via Pseudo-Random Bayesian Inference
Authors
Yi Yu, Libing Wu, Zhuangzhuang Zhang, Jing Qiu, Lijuan Huo, Jiaqi Feng
Abstract
Collaborative perception (CP) enables multiple vehicles to augment their individual perception capacities through the exchange of feature-level sensory data. However, this fusion mechanism is inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially in fully untrusted-vehicle environments. Existing defense approaches often assume a trusted ego vehicle as a reference or incorporate additional binary classifiers. These assumptions limit their practicality in real-world deployments due to the questionable trustworthiness of ego vehicles, the requirement for real-time detection, and the need for generalizability across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Pseudo-Random Bayesian Inference (PRBI) framework, a first efficient defense method tailored for fully untrusted-vehicle CP. PRBI detects adversarial behavior by leveraging temporal perceptual discrepancies, using the reliable perception from the preceding frame as a dynamic reference. Additionally, it employs a pseudo-random grouping strategy that requires only two verifications per frame, while applying Bayesian inference to estimate both the number and identities of malicious vehicles. Theoretical analysis has proven the convergence and stability of the proposed PRBI framework. Extensive experiments show that PRBI requires only 2.5 verifications per frame on average, outperforming existing methods significantly, and restores detection precision to between 79.4% and 86.9% of pre-attack levels.
Metadata
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"raw_xml": "<entry>\n <id>http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.08498v1</id>\n <title>All Vehicles Can Lie: Efficient Adversarial Defense in Fully Untrusted-Vehicle Collaborative Perception via Pseudo-Random Bayesian Inference</title>\n <updated>2026-03-09T15:32:04Z</updated>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.08498v1' rel='alternate' type='text/html'/>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.08498v1' rel='related' title='pdf' type='application/pdf'/>\n <summary>Collaborative perception (CP) enables multiple vehicles to augment their individual perception capacities through the exchange of feature-level sensory data. However, this fusion mechanism is inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially in fully untrusted-vehicle environments. Existing defense approaches often assume a trusted ego vehicle as a reference or incorporate additional binary classifiers. These assumptions limit their practicality in real-world deployments due to the questionable trustworthiness of ego vehicles, the requirement for real-time detection, and the need for generalizability across diverse scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Pseudo-Random Bayesian Inference (PRBI) framework, a first efficient defense method tailored for fully untrusted-vehicle CP. PRBI detects adversarial behavior by leveraging temporal perceptual discrepancies, using the reliable perception from the preceding frame as a dynamic reference. Additionally, it employs a pseudo-random grouping strategy that requires only two verifications per frame, while applying Bayesian inference to estimate both the number and identities of malicious vehicles. Theoretical analysis has proven the convergence and stability of the proposed PRBI framework. Extensive experiments show that PRBI requires only 2.5 verifications per frame on average, outperforming existing methods significantly, and restores detection precision to between 79.4% and 86.9% of pre-attack levels.</summary>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.CV'/>\n <published>2026-03-09T15:32:04Z</published>\n <arxiv:comment>Accepted by CVPR 2026</arxiv:comment>\n <arxiv:primary_category term='cs.CV'/>\n <author>\n <name>Yi Yu</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Libing Wu</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Zhuangzhuang Zhang</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Jing Qiu</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Lijuan Huo</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Jiaqi Feng</name>\n </author>\n </entry>"
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