Paper
A Software-Defined Testbed for Quantifying Deauthentication Resilience in Modern Wi-Fi Networks
Authors
Alex Carbajal, Asma Jodeiri Akbarfam
Abstract
Wi-Fi deauthentication attacks remain a practical denial-of-service (DoS) threat by exploiting unprotected management frames to disrupt client connectivity. In this work, we introduce a software-defined testbed to measure Wi-Fi resilience to deauthentication attacks. We experimentally evaluate five wireless security configurations: open networks, WPA1, WPA2 without Protected Management Frames (PMF), WPA2 with PMF, and WPA3. Using controlled experiments, we measure client disconnection rates, packet injection volume, and time-to-disruption under each configuration. Packet-level behavior is analyzed using standard wireless auditing tools. Open networks, WPA1, and WPA2 without PMF proved entirely vulnerable to deauthentication, while no successful attacks were observed for WPA2 with PMF or WPA3 under tested conditions. These findings confirm the effectiveness of management-frame protection and highlight the continued risk posed by legacy or misconfigured wireless deployments.
Metadata
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Raw Data (Debug)
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"raw_xml": "<entry>\n <id>http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23513v1</id>\n <title>A Software-Defined Testbed for Quantifying Deauthentication Resilience in Modern Wi-Fi Networks</title>\n <updated>2026-02-26T21:33:56Z</updated>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.23513v1' rel='alternate' type='text/html'/>\n <link href='https://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.23513v1' rel='related' title='pdf' type='application/pdf'/>\n <summary>Wi-Fi deauthentication attacks remain a practical denial-of-service (DoS) threat by exploiting unprotected management frames to disrupt client connectivity. In this work, we introduce a software-defined testbed to measure Wi-Fi resilience to deauthentication attacks. We experimentally evaluate five wireless security configurations: open networks, WPA1, WPA2 without Protected Management Frames (PMF), WPA2 with PMF, and WPA3. Using controlled experiments, we measure client disconnection rates, packet injection volume, and time-to-disruption under each configuration. Packet-level behavior is analyzed using standard wireless auditing tools. Open networks, WPA1, and WPA2 without PMF proved entirely vulnerable to deauthentication, while no successful attacks were observed for WPA2 with PMF or WPA3 under tested conditions. These findings confirm the effectiveness of management-frame protection and highlight the continued risk posed by legacy or misconfigured wireless deployments.</summary>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.CR'/>\n <category scheme='http://arxiv.org/schemas/atom' term='cs.NI'/>\n <published>2026-02-26T21:33:56Z</published>\n <arxiv:comment>6 pages, 5 figures, 1 table. Accepted for publication in IEEE SoutheastCon 2026</arxiv:comment>\n <arxiv:primary_category term='cs.CR'/>\n <author>\n <name>Alex Carbajal</name>\n </author>\n <author>\n <name>Asma Jodeiri Akbarfam</name>\n </author>\n </entry>"
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